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ARTICLE
Data promiscuity: how the public–private
distinction shaped digital data infrastructures and
notions of privacy
Klaus Hoeyer 1✉
This essay discusses the performative effects of the public–private distinction on digital data
infrastructures in healthcare. The words ‘public’ and ‘private’ hold many meanings. This
analysis focuses on how they are used both in an informational sense (what is kept secret or
strictly controlled versus what is out in the open or shared) and an institutional sense (issues
of ownership and purpose such as being state-owned and governed for the common good or
privately owned and aimed at generating profit). In the political construction of digital
infrastructures, the two senses are deeply intertwined: changes in relation to ownership and
purpose affect what is kept secret and what is shared. Furthermore, when policymakers
search for ways to protect one aspect (privacy) they sometimes opt for tools from the other
(by conceiving of data as private property). The informational interconnectedness facilitated
by digital infrastructures produces a form of ‘data promiscuity’. Data promiscuity is a con-
dition where data are indiscriminate in the choice of partners: what is seen as data on a thing
for one purpose can always become seen as data on another aspect of that thing and be used
for another purpose and by another user. Data are set free to pursue gain or pleasure, but this
freedom involves certain dangers for the persons from whom they derive. Data promiscuity is
the contemporary condition of possibility for health research. By unpacking the wholesale
categories of public and private through which the contemporary situation came about, there
is a better chance of rethinking the problems it involves, and for suggesting new solutions to
ensure social sustainability. The argument is based on developments in one of the most
fiercely digitalised and datafied countries in the world: Denmark.
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Introduction
In the course of just a few decades, pervasive digitalisation hasfacilitated an unprecedented datafication of many aspects ofmodern life (Ruckenstein and Schüll, 2017; van Dijck, 2014).
This datafication has created new pathways of information
exchange and involved transformations of economic and political
infrastructures. With this paper, I suggest that these changes have
been influenced by the work of a public–private distinction that
social scientists and political actors use to describe societal pro-
blems, as well as to invent political solutions. The public–private
distinction, however, not only describes problems and solutions;
it prescribes them by way of shaping policy thinking. The dis-
tinction provides, in Geertz’ (1973) sense, both a model of and a
model for reality. The distinction is nonetheless engrained in a
cultural ideology that poorly captures the multiple and complex
interests of the citizens subject to datafication. It is therefore time
to look at what it has produced as a model for infrastructures of
digital datafication and to pursue new solutions.
While the public–private distinction is used in many senses,1
two of them stand out in relation to digital data sharing (Ariès,
1989; Johansen and Andrews, 2016); one relating to informational
aspects (what is kept secret or strictly controlled versus what is
out in the open or shared) and the other to institutional issues of
ownership and purpose (typically seen as a matter of being state-
owned and governed for the common good, or privately owned
and aimed at generating profit). These two aspects are particularly
interesting to look at in tandem because a datafied economy
implies transformations in both the informational (who gets
access to what) and institutional (who owns, operates and profits)
aspects of emerging data infrastructures. This is perhaps most
forcefully seen in the EU General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), which is explicitly aimed at a double agenda of pro-
moting a single market for data (institutional transformations)
while enhancing privacy rights (informational transformations).
Today, ‘data’ on people have become embedded in open-ended
digital networks. In such networks, data are always subject to
potential viewing. They are ‘promiscuous’ in the sense of being
relatively indiscriminate in their relations to users: what is seen as
data on a thing for one purpose can always become seen as data
on another aspect of that thing and be used for another purpose
and by another user. Data are relational: they are not data on any
one thing, but on whatever a given analysis uses them to inves-
tigate (Leonelli, 2016). Accordingly, there is no clear definition of
health data anymore: any type of data can become data on health
when used to predict a health outcome. Big data analytics has
undermined any clear subject matter delineations. Furthermore,
Prainsack (2019) points to the multiplicity of data, as being ‘able
to be in more places than one at the same time, in leaving traces
even when they are ‘deleted’, and of being able to be copied
and used by several people at the same time, independent of what
the others are doing’ (p. 13). This multiplicity gives rise to
promiscuity.
Promiscuity is typically associated with indiscriminate choice
of sexual partners and though this practice is admittedly asso-
ciated with certain elements of pleasure, the risks of unintended
offspring and dangers to health has made the promiscuous person
subject to moral condemnation. In response to public concerns
about data privacy, the GDPR and related forms of policy work
similarly tend to make individuals responsible for restraining and
controlling data relations. As a result, the exposed data subjects
can be blamed for lack of prudence and self-restraint. Data
monogamy is presented as the safe choice for individual citizens,
just as self-restraint has been the dominant public advice guiding
morality on sexual desires throughout history. Data infra-
structures, nonetheless, incentivise data sharing—or incentivise
data promiscuity, as it were. Therefore, there is a need for tools
other than encouragement of individual (self-) control to protect
citizens in data-intensive societies. Data monogamy is hardly a
choice, when ‘data sharing’ is simultaneously becoming a pre-
condition for societal engagement.
To develop better tools, I suggest unpacking the broad cate-
gories public and private to see how they shape data infra-
structures. A good place to start investigating the performative
effects of the public–private distinction on digital datafication is
Denmark—a small European welfare state, which is among the
most radically digitized and datafied countries in the world
(Hoeyer, 2016). Denmark is a small welfare state in northern
Europe with just 5.7 million inhabitants, but it is a country taking
the role of dedicated digital frontrunner. Public registers, elec-
tronic health records, social services and commercial services
such as banking, telecommunication and transport options all
operate in digital information infrastructures using the same
traceable identity numbers. For decades, the Danish health data
infrastructures have received international praise as essential
resources for epidemiological research (Frank, 2000, 2003).
Today, they are seen also as resources for economic growth
(Hoeyer, 2019; Tarkkala et al., 2019). To understand the condi-
tions of possibility for health research in a digital age, it is
therefore time to understand the wider transformations of data
infrastructures through digitalisation.
After a brief discussion of the public–private distinction and a
note on methods, I outline first how the public–private distinc-
tion has informed a political ideology that has changed Danish
welfare state infrastructures, including the health services. A
programme of New Public Management has interacted with fierce
digitalisation and a very data-intensive form of government and
clinical care. In the next two sections, I turn to the implications of
these transformations: first with respect to the informational
aspects of the public–private distinction, and then the institu-
tional ones. In this way, I explore not only the performative
effects of the distinction, but also the concerns and interests that
it is typically used to denote. In conclusion, I discuss the need for
moving beyond the solutions that public–private thinking tend to
offer to address those concerns.
The public–private distinction
In the course of considering the enduring interest in negotiations
of secrecy in light of changing institutional structures, Jeff
Weintraub suggests that the public–private distinction can ‘nei-
ther be conveniently simplified, nor usefully avoided’ (1997:38).
The point is to become aware of how it shapes political logics, and
to shift the focus from what the public–private distinction means
to what it does in our contemporary data economies. A first step
in this direction is to acknowledge that public and private are not
ontologically separate domains. In a seminal article on the
public–private distinction, feminist linguist Susan Gal once
argued that though it is common to talk of a ‘blurring of
boundaries’ between public and private, such talk relies on a basic
misunderstanding (Gal, 2002). Public–private thinking operates
as a ‘fractal distinction’, she argues, meaning that any segment
that has been divided into either public or private can itself be
subdivided again into its ‘public’ and ‘private’ aspects. As other
fractal distinctions (e.g., nature/culture, female/male), the
public–private divide is a sense-making device shaping the world
that it is said to classify: public and private are performative
concepts that align activities with meanings and thereby shape
people’s behaviour.
Gal specifically suggests exploring how ideas about public/
private can become institutionally engrained and create moral
zones with special rules. She provides an example from the era of
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communist Eastern Europe where taking something from what
was considered the public realm could be experienced as a smart
appropriation of resources, while taking something in a similar
way from a realm deemed private was considered theft. The
public–private distinction in this way defines moral responsi-
bilities, and it is politically effective because it is perceived
as merely descriptive and referring to ontologically distinct
categories.
The institutional transformations that I explore in this paper
revolve around data infrastructures and therefore they have
implications not only for ownership and moral attributions of
rights to profit, but also for the informational aspects of the
public–private distinction; for privacy. This takes us to the
informational aspects of the distinction. One of the first, and
certainly one of the most influential, legal treatments of a ‘right to
privacy’ is an article by Warren and Brandies (1890). It came as a
response to the invention of photography and its use in gossip
magazines to convey unsolicited images of people. Ideas about a
right to be left alone in ‘public’ spaces have a history preceding
the camera, though. In his classic 1974 book The Fall of Public
Man, sociologist Richard Sennett argued that big cities gave rise
to a feeling of a right to pass others on the street while pretending
not to be noticed. It was the unavoidable closeness of the city that
generated a pretence of distance. Today, digital platforms and
health data infrastructures similarly create unavoidable closeness
as people cannot avoid leaving data traces that can be seen and
used by others.
What counts as a privacy intrusion is not stable, and ideas
about privacy have undergone drastic transformations through-
out history (Ariès, 1989). While people have always cared about
what they share with whom, ideas about how to make that choice
differ significantly over time. As sociologist Georg Simmel
(1950a) asserted, the basic dialectic between what is kept secret
and what is manifest shapes every society. He also argued that
secrecy is never ultimate. Instead, secrecy is about the means
available to people to control what is shared with whom. More-
over, indeed, digital infrastructures influence that political
struggle in ways Simmel could hardly have foreseen.
To explore the work done by the ‘public–private’ distinction, I
now turn to the digital infrastructures in Denmark. I was inspired
to write this paper in the course of ongoing fieldwork where I
combine policy analysis with participation in meetings, work-
shops and conferences, as well as interviews with stakeholders in
ministries, health data organisations, and associations for indus-
trial partners. I also interview people involved in setting up data
infrastructures, data analysts and activists engaged in data-
intensive healthcare practices. I have participated in more than 35
events and conducted >60 interviews, and along with these
activities I have gathered a lot of material (reports, news stories,
policy papers) on ongoing digital transformations. For this paper,
I have traced the history of the involved institutions discussed by
the informants building an archive of material from homepages,
minutes, news stories and interviews. It is impossible to deliver a
comprehensive overview of all of the transformations and I can
only present some examples from the wider archive to illustrate
what I have come to see as general trends. I first illustrate how the
public–private distinction together with digitalised datafication
have changed Danish welfare state infrastructures.
‘Privatising’ infrastructures: Denmark as digital frontrunner
The modern welfare state came into being in tandem with the
construction of infrastructures for communication, energy sup-
ply, and transport; as well as strong informational infrastructures
to ensure adequate statistics indicative of population needs
(Sætnan et al., 2011). In Denmark, as in the other Nordic
countries, the infrastructural agencies were originally owned by
the state or municipalities. Beginning in the 1980s, the agencies
supplying many of the infrastructures have turned into state-
sanctioned, but mostly commercially-run companies. The gov-
ernance of the services has shifted from a wider social contract
between state and citizen to contractual relationships outlining
the distribution of tasks, rights and duties between citizens (as
users), companies (as service providers) and the authorities (as
custodians).
In Denmark, this transformation in ownership and contractual
form was set in motion with the Danish version of New Public
Management, the so-called ‘modernisation programme’ from
1983 (Finansministeriet, 1983). This programme sought to model
the ‘public sector’ on ideas associated with the ‘private sector’, in
order to achieve benefits associated with ‘private’ companies,
namely efficiency through competition. The ‘modernisation
programme’ corresponds in many ways to what Thatcher initi-
ated in the UK and Reagan in the US, and its implications have
been scrutinised by governmentality studies and related forms of
social critique. It created a new demand for data to make ‘public’
service delivery respond to performance measurements in pursuit
of ‘market’ mechanisms. As elsewhere, changing governments
also gradually privatised the ownership of various infrastructural
agencies. The national postal services (Post Danmark, later
PostNord), telecommunication and internet delivery (KTAS, later
TDC), energy supply (DONG), and the operation of public
transport options have, one by one, been turned into companies.
If the modernisation programme created a data-intensive form
of government, it could do so by drawing upon already existing
data infrastructures. In 1968, Danish authorities for taxation
purposes established a central identity register, the Central Person
Register (CPR), which assigned each citizen a ten-digit number.
All property and all companies were similarly given a number.
Once in place, the CPR number has come to be used in all
encounters with public services, as well as increasingly in the
commercial sector. The ability to validate the identity of citizens
with high certainty, has made the CPR an attractive partner for a
constant flow of new users and for new purposes way beyond
taxation. Today, the CPR number is offered for use according to a
payment model for commercial services in need of user identity
validation (achieving the identity verification that companies like
Facebook and Google aim for). The CPR systems in the Nordic
countries have facilitated the generation of some of the most
comprehensive databases in the world with an ability to combine
educational, occupational, income, taxation and health data in
long time series (OECD, 2013).2 The CPR is an essential resource
for health research allowing investigation of the interplay of
social, economic, environmental and medical factors. Most Danes
probably consider the CPR system ‘public’ and the whole-data-
intensive form of government as indicative of the goals of the
welfare state. The homepages describing the register would give
no other impression. The running of the register, however, has for
years been outsourced to an international IT company, CSC,3 and
private sector actors that use the register are not required to make
their data available for public research.
As the Danish form of government is so data-intensive and
tracks each citizen in great detail, it has created a push for digital
technologies to handle all the data (see also Andrejevic, 2013).
Digitalisation is and has for decades been a high political priority
in Denmark and is also acknowledged as essential for ensuring
the availability of the data needed for New Public Management
(Forskningsministeriet, 1994). State ambitions of ensuring Den-
mark a position as digital frontrunner are not limited to the so-
called ‘public’ sector. Already in the 1960s, the Nordic banks
collaborated with public authorities on the digitalisation of the
financial sector. A computerised billing method known as PBS
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(da; Pengeinstitutternes Betalingsservice) was introduced in 1968
in Denmark, and in updated formats it today ensures an almost
fully digitalised billing system. In 1983, a national credit card
(Dankort) introduced digital payment and Denmark quickly had
the highest number of digital payments in the world. In 2000, a
national digital postal service system called E-Boks was invented.
In 2005, state authorities decided to use E-Boks for correspon-
dence to all public employees and in 2012, a law made it the
default means of communication with all citizens. It is also used
in the health services and for invitations to participate in research.
In 2003, a national secure access and identity system called
NemID was developed by a consortium of companies in response
to a public tender. Today, it is used by both authorities and
commercial service providers. E-Boks similarly came about
through a government initiative but operates as a shareholder
company partly owned by another shareholder company, NETS,
which is also behind the digital payment option, the Dankort and
NemID. In fact, most of the ‘public’ digital services are owned by
or outsourced to various combinations of a select group of
companies, including, NETS, IBM, CSC and KMD (all known
under their abbreviations).4 In consequence, Danish citizens
today consistently interact with what is described as ‘public’
services (authorities) through ‘privately’ (i.e., commercially)
delivered digital interfaces.
In sum, digitalisation and datafication have emerged through
not just technological developments but also as a consequence of
the urge to modernise the state based on ideals associated with
the ‘private’ sector. As digital infrastructures for ‘public data’ are
outsourced to, run by or maintained by commercial companies, it
makes little sense to see public and private as ontologically dis-
tinct domains. Rather, notions of public and private legitimise
certain forms of organisation. Public/private thinking justifies
that the infrastructures are run commercially to achieve values
associated with the ‘private sphere’ such as ‘innovation’, ‘effi-
ciency’ and ‘digital competence’ (see also Mazzucato, 2015).
After having in this way outlined the infrastructural transfor-
mations enacted in the image of the public–private distinction
and in pursuit of digitalisation, I now turn to the implications of
these transformations by looking at the aspects of life that the
public–private distinction is typically used to describe. I begin
with the informational aspects (what is kept secret and what is
manifest and to whom) and then in the subsequent section
explore institutional aspects (ownership and attribution of praise
and blame).
Informational implications: the secret and the manifest
The digitalisation of data infrastructures intervenes in intriguing
ways in the dialectic between the informational aspects of private
and public, or what Simmel (1950a) called the secret and the
manifest. Digital data integration and the more complex networks
of commercial suppliers open up access for many more potential
users than the old closed filing cabinet did in the offices of
authorised civil servants or health professionals. The paper-based
medical record used by the general practitioner in the old days
primarily served as a local memory-assisting device. A digital
database, in contrast, always has multiple users and an in-built
potentiality (Winthereik et al., 2007). There have always been
ways of peeping into files; what the transformations above have
done is to change the conditions under which people negotiate
the secret and the manifest and the complexity they need to
manoeuvre to do so.
Data infrastructures are designed to both facilitate and control
data flows (Andrejevic, 2013; Ruppert et al., 2017). The Danish
authorities are well aware that data integration aimed at giving
new actors access also comes with a risk of unauthorised viewing
or even data leakage. Accordingly, they typically emphasise ‘data
security’ as an important feature of all policies (Danske Regioner,
2017; Lindstrøm et al., 2017). This sounds simple, but it is not.
On the one hand, total data security is an illusion; on the other
hand, what authorities deem ‘safe’ in the sense that only
authorised personal access data, might still involve making cer-
tain pieces of information available to selected staff members that
individual citizens would have preferred keeping secret. Data
integration is about changing who may know what about whom,
and technical data security cannot resolve this type of basic
political disagreement (Wadmann and Hoeyer, 2018).
The intricate implications for informational privacy of digital
integration of health data can be illustrated with Denmark’s
e-health portal (Sundhed.dk). This portal integrates access to
medical records, lab results, pharmacy prescriptions and other
forms of data. In some surveys it is rated as one of the most
advanced in the world (Frost and Sullivan, 2017). In the name of
empowerment, citizens have also been given online access to their
health data through the portal: the policy logic was that data
‘belong’ to the citizens (note the metaphor of private ownership),
and therefore they should have access to them. Interestingly, the
e-health portal had to invent a so-called ‘privacy’ function to
allow citizens also to limit which elements that can be viewed
online. The privacy function allows citizens to hide material not
just from health professionals, but also—and more surprisingly—
from the citizens themselves. Data remain available for adminis-
trative and research purposes. The function does not ensure total
data monogamy.
Why would people keep data hidden from themselves? It
turned out that some patients felt forced by family members,
employers and insurance companies to share a printout of their
data now that their whole medical history was so easily available
to them. Hence, this form of ‘privacy marking’ in effect has come
to mean keeping data away from the individual whose privacy is a
stake, rather than in the hands of this same individual citizen.
‘Ownership’ of the data was not empowering, when it meant
others could exert powers over the owner. No access was a better
form of protection. To keep data ‘secret’ is in this case to keep it
in the ‘public’ database only, out of reach from the data subject.
Of course, Danish digital infrastructures also leak in the classic
sense. In fact, there is a continuous stream of media stories about
data leaks. The most notorious leaks are those about famous
people having their secrets exposed.5 One such leak gained
enormous press coverage following the revelation that a tabloid
magazine called Se og Hør illegally bought credit card information
on famous people. In English, the magazine’s name would mean
‘See and Hear’; and it is indeed a magazine specialising in privacy
intrusion in the old sense of Warren and Brandeis (1890). The
magazine’s snitch was a man employed by IBM to do work for
NETS on the maintenance of the national credit card, Dankort,
and the access code system, NemID. Through him journalists
could trace, for example, the holiday destinations of the royal
family or where celebrities were giving birth (Retten i Glostrup,
2016). The digitalisation of the financial infrastructure thus gave
multiple actors access to information, including health informa-
tion: a state-sanctioned privately run infrastructure gave multiple
points of access to intimate data and made them subject to
(illegal) trade.6 The infrastructural transformations had infor-
mational implications.
When I have interviewed patients, they are rarely concerned
about data leaks of the type broadcasted with the Se og Hør
revelation. They are worried only when they are confronted with
their own data in unexpected places or used against their own
interests, as when a doctor mentions having noticed a psychiatric
diagnosis in their record while actually treating something else. In
an interview I conducted together with (colleague’s name deleted
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for anonymity), a woman with a chronic disease thus talked about
sometimes feeling uncomfortable when doctors or civil servants
mentioned things from her files that she herself found irrelevant
for the specific condition she wanted to discuss. She then said
something that has stayed with me. Even if it might be unusual, I
believe it illustrates an interesting point about the kind of work
that the public–private distinction performs as people seek to
separate the secret and the manifest in the new digitally integrated
data landscape:
I have a feeling that the day I got diagnosed, many years
ago, I became public property. I have some kind of
obligation towards my society; there is some kind of right to
step in and pry into my life. It is a combination of all sorts
of registers where you can extract all sorts of information
about me that others are not obliged to deliver about
themselves, as persons.
Although she says ‘I have some kind of obligation’, she
simultaneously questions this obligation. She feels infringed,
and relates it to ‘prying’. Hence, she gives the impression of
moving in a landscape of obligations that she does not
acknowledge as legitimate. One of the things that makes this
quote remarkable is that she worked for a patient organisation
to promote data integration and to improve collaborations
between data-responsible authorities and the pharmaceutical
industry. She articulated the ‘private’ realm as one of clever
innovation where she felt patient organisations could engage in
actual negotiations of research content. So, the experience of
being ‘public property’ was associated with a sense of duty and
a passive patient role marked by lack of control, while her sense
of ‘private company’ related to experiences with actual invol-
vement. ‘Public’ use of data was prying, while ‘private’ was
sharing. Again, public and private are performative concepts
that intervene in the dialectic of the secret and the manifest.
They can make people provide data out of duty in the ‘public
sector’ and then promote further data sharing with the ‘private
sector’ to reach goals of innovation.
Along with the integration of ‘public data’ there is a monu-
mental growth in the data economy of social media and data
collecting devices controlled by commercial US digital giants
such as Apple, Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Amazon. Here
data are shared, yes, but cultural studies scholars have pointed
out how the sharing involved is asymmetrical: the citizen
‘shares’ while the data becomes accumulated behind payment
walls (Gehl, 2015), and the use of the data remains proprietary
and is essentially kept secret from the data subjects (Crawford
et al., 2015). Exclusive access is part of the business model (and
therefore public researchers are often barred access). Citizens
are made manifest; but the users remain secret. When con-
strued as commercial optimisation, these platforms can enrol
all their users as research participants without informing them
or others about the research or its results. It is proprietary
information. Data might be appropriated from these platforms
by so-called ‘data scrapers’, who find information on social
media to generate data profiles for sale (Angwin and Stecklow,
2010), or they can be appropriated by hackers or by national
intelligence agencies. The data subjects, however, do not see or
control those who pay to use their data.
Digitalised data infrastructures in this way make data available
for infinite potential viewing: there is always an additional
potential reader (Bowker, 2005). Online activity creates data
doubles, and the lives of these ‘doppelgängers’ are inherently
promiscuous (Bode and Kristensen, 2015). This form of unwar-
ranted data promiscuity inadvertently puts the individual at risk.
As digital infrastructures are set up for data sharing, they always
involve multiple points of access. The complexity creates an
unspecific form of oblivion and a general inability to grasp who
does what with the exchanged data. What can be experienced as a
loss of privacy, is more precisely described as a loss of insight into
the control of secrecy (Pasquale, 2015). If an old-fashioned letter
had been opened, the recipient was likely to find out. However,
how will data subjects know who has access to which secrets
when digitally stored in complex networks? It is not only the
informational aspects of the public–private distinction that are
affected by the infrastructural transformations, however, and
therefore I now turn to the institutional implications.
Institutional implications: ‘public’ and ‘private’ moral zones
‘Public’ and ‘private’, though clearly not ontologically separate
domains, have become entrenched as separate moral zones so
that actors viewed as ‘private’, such as IBM, NETS and KMD, face
different political and economic opportunities and responsibilities
than do the actors deemed ‘public’, such as governmental min-
istries, regions and municipalities. If the public–private distinc-
tion as a sense-making device implied incentivising public
services (authorities) to operate in the same way as private
markets (companies), the performativity of the moral zones of the
distinction (how people use it to ascribe praise and blame) have
proven to operate with reverse effect. Here, ‘public’ is supposed to
be as different as possible from ‘private’. It means that profit and
blame are distributed unequally, as I will show.
The market value of the ‘private’ company NETS stems, as
described above, from a series of ‘publicly’ sanctioned mono-
polies: NemID, E-Boks and digital payment options. Without the
Danish authorities making the use of these monopolies easy and
sometimes mandatory, there was no ‘market’, or, it would be
considerably smaller. In the case of KMD, its products were
developed by and with public authorities, and its customers are
primarily these authorities: the income is derived from taxation.
Both KMD and NETS, however, have been sold off to equity
funds and the profit generated in that process has been appro-
priated by individuals and companies, not authorities. Like
economist Mazzucato argues in The Entrepreneurial State, the
public sector often makes the investment while the private
companies get the fame and the profit (Mazzucato, 2015). When
in 2017 an equity fund offered to buy additional shares of NETS,
the CEO Bo Nilsson was personally able to cash in more than 620
million DKK (>80 million €), equivalent to the annual turnover of
the company. One year later he was once again able to extract
more than double that sum. Although the value is clearly derived
from its publicly authorised digital monopolies, and though the
money to the CEO will have to be paid by the Danish citizens
who are obliged by law to use the company services, it is fully
legal for this huge amount to become his ‘private property’ (after
just few years of employment). It did give rise to various
expressions of envy and critique in the media, but it did not lead
to a discussion about making this type of appropriation illegal. It
is described, not as theft, but as a bonus.
Above I described how formerly state-owned infrastructures
were ‘privatised’ based on ideas about competence and efficiency
associated with for-profit companies. This cultural ideology also
seems to overrule and silence the more questionable experiences.
For example, when KMD was sold to the equity fund Advent
International and when CSC acquired Datacentralen (see above
and notes 2 and 3), the sales led to so-called trimming of the
‘companies’. Shortly after CSC fired 900 employees in 2013, an
unfortunate lack of maintenance of the CPR register led to a leak
of 900,000 CPR numbers. The institutional transformation in this
way spilled over into informational risks, but it did not lead to
media critique of the company’s ‘competence’. CSC was also
supposed to deliver a system to the police (Toft, 2016a) and
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another one together with KMD to the tax authorities (Toft,
2016b). Both of them failed. A number of other product failures
and a series of notorious data leaks also surround KMD (Toft,
2017). In the case of the system for the tax authorities, some
observers estimate the resulting loss of tax revenue for the Danish
state to be above 100 billion DKK (13 billion €) (Mølsted, 2017).
CSC has recently failed to deliver a functioning update to the
national patient register that serves as the backbone of medical
research in Denmark, and 2019 is now known as the year of
missing data. CSC, however, does not stand to lose.
The Se and Hør data leaks from NETS and IBM have been
described above too, and it is worth adding that NETS was
warned several times about IBM having problems with meeting
security standards from 2007 onwards but did not react.7 Instead,
blame is directed at the public authorities when commercial
companies fail to deliver according to contract. The National
Board of Health Data is held responsible for CSC’s failure to
deliver a patient registry. The commercial right to profit is
uncontested.8 A company might fail in proving its presumed
‘competence’; but when this happens in a public–private part-
nership it is typically seen as an inability of the public authority to
control the process properly.
The point is that when profits can be appropriated by these
companies despite their failures, it is indicative of a culture where
‘public’ and ‘private’ have become associated with different moral
zones. The digital infrastructure is not ‘private’ or ‘public’, but the
moral zones of economic opportunity and political blame have
come to operate in this way. These moral zones shape health data
research in various ways by directing blame where little is to be
done. It undermines the social sustainability of research that is
dependent on data access. Furthermore, actors viewed as ‘private’,
such the pharmaceutical industry, are often ascribed a dubious
morality irrespective of what they do. The moral zones of the
public–private distinction ascribe doubtful motives to commercial
actors in the area of health, irrespective of their actual track
history and proven performance. In this way, the moral zones of
public and private fundamentally shape the conditions of possi-
bility for health research.
Discussion: searching for new solutions in an age of data
promiscuity
This paper has sketched out some of the transformations of
infrastructures in Denmark as they have unfolded in the pursuit
of a digitalised data economy. First, I have suggested that the
transformations have been shaped (though not determined) by
the public–private distinction in the sense that the political goals
have been to ‘privatise’ the infrastructure and to model state
services on ideas about ‘private’ markets. Secondly, I have out-
lined the implications of the infrastructural changes for the
informational and the institutional aspects of these infra-
structures. In terms of informational implications, I have shown
how the changes in infrastructure have transformed the condi-
tions under which people negotiate which pieces of information
to share with whom. They have not lost an absolute or well-
defined form of privacy; but they have lost influence on and
insight into the increasingly complex infrastructures and number
of stakeholders that now handle their secrets. In terms of insti-
tutional implications, I have shown how the public–private dis-
tinction has been used to justify unequal distribution of
responsibilities and profit among agencies depending on whether
they are seen as ‘public’ or ‘private’. Monetary flows, work tasks,
and informational exchanges between companies and public
agencies are fully intertwined, but they operate in different moral
zones. The public–private distinction serves not as a simple
model of reality, but as a model for organisational expectations
that reinforces this separation of moral zones. In this sense, the
distinction has performative effects.
While some observers will see the developments as technol-
ogy-driven, I have focused on the social urge for data, and on
the performative effects of socially engrained notions of ‘public’
and ‘private’. In this way, I have emphasised the social forces at
play, not to disregard the agency of the material infrastructure
but to direct attention towards the ways in which we think
about and organise them (cf. Andrejevic et al., 2015). The point
has been to shift the focus from what the distinction means to
what it does. As noted with Weintraub (1997) above, we cannot
simply erase the distinction, but we can begin to unpack public
and private as grand ontological categories, and instead look at
who has what at stake in relation to specific aspects (institu-
tional or informational) of the world. When we remember that
‘public’ and ‘private’ are sense-making devices with effects on
organisation (and not descriptive names for ontological divi-
sions), we can explore more openly the effects of naming and
framing something as ‘public’ or ‘private’ and move beyond the
logics that the categories tend to install. These effects, in turn,
are technologically mediated and to trace where data flow
involves acknowledging technological agency too.
How might greater awareness of public–private as a fractal dis-
tinction then help rethink the problems and concerns outlined
above and perhaps pave the way for new solutions? First, it can
make us see how the GDPR draws upon the public–private dis-
tinction in unfortunate ways. The GDPR gave individuals ‘rights’ to
access, delete and sell (through the ‘portability principle’) data on
themselves, but the very notion of ‘portability’ here reveals how this
approach to privacy as matters of private property is as much about
facilitating as retraining data exchange. It reifies ideas about data as
‘private’, discrete entities available for commercial exchange, as
foreseen already by Lyotard (1984) in The Postmodern Condition
(see also Prainsack, 2019).9 However, data are multiple and unstable
objects and never just data on one person or one thing. Health data
might be data on a patient’s disease, but it is also data on the
treating physician, the hospital, and the laboratory that delivered a
test. Therefore the use of the property model, ‘it is the patient’s
data’, does not work. When information is datafied, it is to multiply
its uses. Even when data are treated as property by platforms
conjuring data, these platforms monetise on exclusive control with
data based on the ability to reinvent the meaning and purpose of
data uses (van Dijck et al., 2018). Data are relational and can
become data on whatever a researcher makes the subject of inves-
tigation in the course of exploring correlations. Digital integration
means that data can move more easily across domains. Health data
can be used by the social services, for credit assessment, or potential
employers and vice versa. In consequence, it is the basic premise of
data to be promiscuous.
Individual control is an inadequate measure for ensuring
privacy interests. Just as an ethics of monogamy fared better as a
technology of blame than as a means of protection in relation to
sexual promiscuity, responsibilisation of the individual does more
to protect the institutions and companies thriving on data than
the individuals who are asked to hand over data as a precondition
for entering social relations and accessing services. As shown
above, individual access to health data via public platforms can
cause loss of control. Similarly, the individual ‘right’ to enter
agreements with commercial digital platforms can imply sur-
rendering rights rather than gaining them. As a consequence of
the conflation of the informational and institutional meaning of
‘private’, people are asked to click to accept terms of agreement or
cookies, or sign informed consent sheets. It is not even practically
doable to read all of the ‘terms of agreements’ that citizens need to
accept to live a digital life (McDonald and Cranor, 2008). It really
is time to look for new legal tools.
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Instead of proclaiming an individual right to privacy and
suggesting it should be protected with property rights that cannot
be upheld anyway, it is time for a much more thorough political
debate about who may use which data for what purposes. Simmel
encouraged scholars to elucidate the politics of the secret and the
manifest, and digitally mediated research infrastructures are good
places to do so. If we relinquish the conflation of privacy and
property, it might become easier to imagine new and more col-
lective approaches (Mittelstadt and Floridi, 2015; Taylor, 2017).
There might, for example, be room for inventing new types of
data custodians appointed by democratic bodies with well-defined
responsibilities and entitlements to negotiate data uses on behalf
of citizens—someone with a much more defined political role
than what the GDPR calls a data protection officer. Moreover,
how about focusing not on the right of the individual to exert
privacy, but on shared legal safeguards that can step in when
leakages happen? Prainsack (2017) suggests harm mitigation
funds. There is also room for developing new bans on unpro-
ductive or harmful data use. There are elements of the market for
data profiling that could become subject to plain prohibition (e.g.,
the so-called ‘consumer reporting companies’ that profit from
selling data on people to recruitment agencies, insurance com-
panies, and companies wanting to do price discrimination). The
point is to transgress the public–private logic and its implicit
divisions and conflations in order to consider collective solutions
that might better mitigate the potential harms produced by data
intensification.
To begin inventing new logics that move beyond the property
model, it is necessary to realise that there never were such a thing
as 100% ‘private’ data. It is an old insight. Simmel noted that
‘writing is opposed to all secrecy (…) it involves an unlimited,
even if only potential, ‘publicity’’ (Simmel, 1950b: p. 352).
Geoffrey Bowker describes the database as indicative of an ‘epoch
of potential memory’ where ‘the question is not what the state
‘knows’ about a particular individual, say, but what it can know
should the need ever arise’ (Bowker, 2005: p. 30, emphasis origi-
nal). With digitalisation, this potentiality is augmented to an
unprecedented degree. It stretches far beyond ‘the state’. Digita-
lised data infrastructures are devices for potential viewing. People
use the expression ‘my data’, but ‘my data’ is an oxymoron; data
are always potentially shared. Otherwise they would not be data.
It is an ontological premise for digital data to be ‘potentially
viewed’ by unexpected users: data infrastructures are constructed
with some sense of promiscuous data dating in mind. Citizens
leaving data traces as a precondition for pursuing a normal life
should therefore not be held accountable for what they have few
options for controlling.
Finally, there is a need to rethink how the public–private
distinction legitimises the distribution of revenue. The revenue
generated from state-sanctioned tools such as E-Boks could
remain in the hands of either the authorities or in the pockets of
the citizens, for example through bans on extravagant bonus
programmes. There is no going back in time, however, and no
point in longing for a time when infrastructures were run by the
authorities. Rather, the point is for social science critique to
stop projecting clarity back in time as if our current moment
has simply lost a division between public and private that used
to work. Critical data studies must work with data science to
create more socially robust infrastructures (Neff et al., 2017).
Our current problems do not reflect a sudden ‘blurring’ of
previously distinct ontological domains. They reflect an
inability to address the inequalities and lack of justice right in
front of us.
If scientific research is to retain its legitimacy in the wider
public, it should not abstain from using data. Rather, it must use
data to generate insights into such inequalities and other concrete
problems. Research can help find ways of mitigating them. The
social sustainability of health research will not be ensured with
intensified informed consent demands, but with research serving
collective interests without putting individuals at risk.
Data availability
For research ethical reasons, it is not possible to share the
interview transcripts in full.
Received: 24 March 2020; Accepted: 30 June 2020;
Notes
1 Related to these two aspects, but cutting across them, some also use the distinction to
talk about spheres (a public sphere for open debate and a private sphere of
conversation among family and friends) or spaces (public city spaces subject to formal
rules versus private secluded spaces for unregulated interaction) (Sennet, 2017; Sheller
and Urry, 2003).
2 While there are many similarities between the Nordic countries, there are also
significant differences in way the public–private distinction has played out. Sweden has
generally opted for legitimacy through transparency, whereby for example tax
information is presented as public, while Denmark and to some extent Norway
presents the authorities as guardians of secrets.
3 The US technology giant CSC bought the public Danish IT supplier Datacentralen af
1959 and thus acquired access to the governmental sector. Since 2017, the Danish
branch has taken the name DXC Denmark, but for the sake of simplicity I use CSC
throughout here.
4 KMD, or Kommunedata as it was originally called (Eng. Municipality Data), was
established in 1972 and originally a publicly owned service provider. It was privatised
in 2009 but it still holds the contract for processing most public accounting and salary
systems.
5 See also a list of data leakages involving the CPR number: http://www.dr.dk/nyheder/
viden/tech/her-er-ti-moegsager-det-danske-cpr-nummer, last accessed Nov 15, 2017.
6 The national credit card system in many ways protects credit card information better
than in, for example, the US (O’Neil, 2016), so my point here is merely that the
commercial infrastructural guardians, NETS and IBM, are not facing any serious
reproach for the leakages.
7 https://www.computerworld.dk/art/230922/igen-og-igen-og-igen-saa-mange-
advarsler-har-nets-faaet-siden-2007, last accessed Nov 15, 2017.
8 The same mechanism unfolded in 2017 in Sweden as it turned out that IBM had
outsourced the maintenance of confidential Swedish registers to cheap Czech suppliers
without providing security checks. This ended up with two government ministers
losing their jobs for failing to detect the breach.
9 The GDPR should also be acknowledged for having raised awareness of privacy
interests and for trying to hold institutions accountable for data security and technical
safeguards. Technical safeguards are very important indeed; they are just not enough.
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